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Abstract: Previous large-N studies on conflict lethality have focused in large part either on 
structural factors, or on the properties of key conflict protagonists – governments and rebels. This 
article challenges the dyadic two-actor approach to studying conflict lethality that examines 
exclusively the key actors of the dyad, and – on the example of pro-regime militias – hypothesizes 
that participation of extra-state actors in civil wars can exert significant influence on battlefield 
lethality. It is proposed here that pro-regime militias can swell the number of combat deaths 
through, first of all, acting as “extra boots” on the ground, providing governments with auxiliary 
forces, local intelligence and enabling incumbents to launch more effective and often more deadly 
attacks on insurgents. Militias also affect the number of battle deaths by forcing rebels to protect 
their civilian support bases, which exposes insurgents to lethal government attacks. This assumption 
is empirically tested on 88 civil wars from 1981 to 2015 with militia presence. The findings show 
that the presence of pro-regime militias in civil wars is highly conducive to the incidence of high-
casualty conflicts. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Which factors account for combat lethality1 in civil wars? Amidst the general decline in 
numbers of battlefield deaths in interstate armed conflicts since the end of World War II 
(Lacina et al., 2006), it has been established that civil wars cause over 90% of conflict-related 
deaths in contemporary armed conflicts (Lacina, 2006: 276). Existing research on civil war 
lethality has largely prioritised structural causes of conflict lethality, such as ethnic 
                                                 
1 I estimate civil war lethality by the number of combat deaths sustained by armed actors on both sides of 
the dyad. Lethality of civil war is defined in this study in terms of the increase of battle deaths beyond the 
threshold of 999 deaths in a given calendar year, which in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) terms 
distinguishes a “low-intensity” conflict from a “major civil war” (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005: 634). 
Estimating conflict lethality in battle deaths has been described in previous studies as “a reasonable measure of 
the scale of combat” (Lacina, 2006: 278).  
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mobilisation (King, 2001; Sambanis, 2001; Eck, 2009), political regime type (Lacina, 2006; 
Downes, 2008), conflict dynamics (Fearon, 2004; Kalyvas, 2006: 2890), conflict type 
(Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014), geography and topography (Buhaug et al., 2009), and 
economic factors (Collier et al., 2004; Regan and Norton, 2005; Lacina, 2006). The role of 
agency in the lethality of conflict-associated violence has thus far been limited to the dyadic 
dimension, emphasising either state capacity (Lyall and Wilson, 2009), or rebel strength 
(Buhaug, 2006; Wood, 2014; Cunningham et al., 2009). Notwithstanding existing studies, 
research on conflict lethality still lacks systematic analysis on the role of agency (Eck, 2009: 
369). Not much is known as to whether the presence or absence of certain conflict 
protagonists explains the lethality of violence. Most types of non-state actors including, but 
not limited to, criminal organisations, private military contractors, warlords, militias, and 
other armed non-state protagonists – irrespective of their contribution to violence – have been 
traditionally excluded from the two-sided analysis of intrastate conflicts.2  
Of all other armed extra-state actors, pro-regime militias (PRMs)3 are identified, along 
with governments and rebels, as prominent stakeholders in post-World War II armed 
conflicts (Carey et al., 2013). A study by Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2013) has shown that 
pro-regime militias were involved in over 80% of all intrastate conflicts since 1981. A 
burgeoning empirical literature portrays militias as important powerbrokers in most intrastate 
conflicts of the Cold War period (Campbell and Brenner, 2002; Mazzei, 2009; Ahram, 2011; 
Aliyev, 2017; 2018). Carey et al. (2013) found that the presence of pro-regime militias 
accounts for higher incidence of civil war. A growing body of literature examined the role of 
militias in civilian victimisation and genocidal violence (Cohen and Nordås, 2015; Stanton, 
2015; Koren, 2017). It is well documented that PRMs are used as tools of repression against 
civilians (Mitchell et al., 2014) and political rivals of ruling regimes (Aliyev, 2016). 
Notwithstanding the key role of militias in perpetrating atrocities, little is known as to 
whether the presence of PRMs increases the rates of conflict-related violence. A hypothesis 
raised by Kalyvas (2006: 108) that militias “may also cause an escalation in violence” has 
                                                 
2 For example, in his study on multi-actor model of intrastate conflicts, Cunningham (2006) identified 
only three generally defined types of conflict protagonists: government; domestic rebels and external actors. 
3 The term “pro-regime militias” refers to non-state actors organised into armed groups operating outside 
of regular security forces, but either formally or informally associated with the government. This definition 
echoes Bohmelt and Clayton’s (2016: 1) understanding of pro-regime militias as groups with “a link to the 
executive” and “some level of organization” that differ from paramilitary groups, which are trained and created 
by governments to serve as part of regular armed forces.       
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never been either tested empirically or developed further theoretically. The impact of militias 
on conflict lethality remains a missing variable in research on lethality of violence.  
This article argues that the deployment of militias has a potential to increase the level of 
conflict-related violence accounting for higher number of battlefield deaths and contributing 
towards the transformation of low-intensity conflict into a major civil war. Bearing in mind 
that the research on militias’ involvement in civil wars is currently in its infancy, exploring 
the PRMs’ role in intrastate conflicts allows to improve our understanding of more general 
functions performed by quasi-state actors in armed conflicts. This study is one the few large-
N contributions to explore the role of extra-state actors outside of the government-rebels 
dichotomy in the context of civil war lethality. Through its focus on extra-dyadic actors in 
civil wars, this study contributes to broader research on armed conflict which is of relevance 
for the wider community of scholars working on Politics and International Relations.  
This article proceeds further by examining the key strands of existing research on civil 
war lethality. It then introduces theoretical argument on pro-regime militias’ association with 
battlefield deaths and discusses mechanisms through which militias are expected to affect 
conflict lethality. After the presentation of the argument, this article proceeds with discussing 
the data and research design. This section is followed by empirical discussion and 
presentation of findings. The article concludes by summarising findings and contributions, as 
well as discussing prospects for further research on the topic of extra-dyadic actors and 
conflict lethality.     
 
Explaining conflict lethality  
 
Research on explanations of conflict lethality has emphasised the primary significance of the 
type of conflict and ethnic factors. Although a number of other factors were mentioned, such 
as regime type (Downes, 2008), economic development (Lacina et al., 2006) and geography 
(Buhaug et al., 2009), there is no consensus in the literature as to whether these variables 
account for conflict lethality. By contrast, Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) have found a positive 
relationship between conflict lethality and three key types of intrastate conflicts: irregular, 
conventional and symmetric nonconventional wars. The key finding with regard to the 
relationship between the type of civil war and conflict lethality was that conventional 
conflicts “tend to be more severe in terms of battlefield lethality” (Balcells and Kalyvas, 
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2014: 1390). Instead, “irregular conflicts generate greater civilian victimisation” (2014: 
1390). 
Another cause of conflict lethality – ethnicity – had been explored in depth by Eck 
(2009). The key finding of Eck’s (2009: 369) research was that “ethnically mobilized armed 
conflicts have a 92 percent higher risk for intensification to war.” It was theorised that ethnic 
fragmentation enables easier recruitment into rebel groups and ensures loyalty and 
commitment of rebel fighters (Weinstein, 2007; Aliyev, 2019b; Aliyev and Souleimanov, 
2019). This allows ethnicity-based rebel groups to escalate violence far more effectively than 
insurgent organisations that recruit their members along non-ethnic lines. A few other 
scholars have tested the relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and conflict lethality, 
but their findings conflict Eck’s results. For example, Lacina (2006: 287) has found negative 
correlation between ethnic polarisation and conflict lethality. In addition, Balcells and 
Kalyvas (2014: 1405) discovered that “ethnic fractionalization reduces battlefield severity.” 
However, unlike Eck (2009), no other scholars conducted an in-depth nuanced inquiry into 
the relationship between ethnic conflicts and the lethality of violence. This shows that the 
role of ethnicity in conflict lethality is still a contested variable.  
More commonly, conflict lethality regularly emerges as one of control variables in 
various studies that neither focus specifically on the phenomenon, nor seek to theoretically 
explain its dynamics and characteristics (Rouhana et al., 1994; Collier et al., 2004; Harbom 
and Wallensteen, 2005; Heger and Salehyan, 2007; Esteban and Ray, 2008; Krain, 2014; 
Hultman and Peksen, 2015; Petersohn, 2017). As the above described strands of research on 
conflict lethality have dominated the discipline, there are few if any explanations 
emphasising the role of extra-dyadic actors. Previous research has systematically tended to 
disregard the impact of extra-state (or quasi-state) actors – apart from anti-regime groups – on 
the lethality of conflict violence. Even with the steady transition from the dyadic two-actor 
perception of intrastate conflicts towards multi-actor models (Cunningham et al., 2009; 
Gleditsch, 2007), previous large-N analyses on the lethality of civil wars largely ignored the 
role of extra-state conflict stakeholders, focusing instead on the key dyadic actors: 
governments and rebels (Pruitt and Kim, 2005; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). How do pro-
regime actors contribute towards conflict lethality? More specifically, which part do pro-
regime militias play in these processes? 
 
Pro-regime proxies and civil war lethality 
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The expectation that pro-regime militias contribute towards conflict lethality is premised on 
the inherent assumption that the presence of extra-dyadic actors in intrastate conflicts affects 
dynamics of civil wars and influences their outcomes (Cunningham, 2006; Gleditsch, 2007). 
Previous studies on multi-actor civil wars have found that larger numbers of armed actors 
involved in a conflict are likely to contribute to higher conflict lethality (Cunningham, 2011; 
Cunningham, 2013). For example, in-fighting amongst various rebel factions was found to be 
highly conducive to conflict lethality (Bakke et al., 2012; Gade et al., 2019; Maoz and San-
Akca, 2012). Multi-actor conflicts were also described as significantly harder to resolve 
through negotiated settlements (Cunningham, 2006; Svensson, 2007).  
Following the logic that presence of multiple rebel groups in a conflict is likely to 
increase group fragmentation and in-fighting (Bakke et al., 2012), I expect that participation 
of pro-regime proxies in civil wars is likely to complicate conflict dynamics and to increase 
potential for lethal violence. I identify two mechanisms through which militias are expected 
to increase battlefield lethality in intrastate conflicts. Firstly, PRMs act as “force multipliers” 
increasing the number of pro-regime forces and therefore enhancing possibilities for higher 
conflict lethality. Secondly, pro-regime militias produce “collateral lethality” by attacking 
rebel civilian support bases and forcing insurgents to defend their civilian constituencies, 
which potentially exposes the rebels to violent confrontations with pro-regime forces and 
intensifies lethal violence. 
 
“Force-multipliers”  
 
Following the argument that multi-actor conflicts are harder to resolve due to the diversity of 
interests involved (Cunningham, 2006), which eventually leads to higher levels of battlefield 
lethality (Lacina, 2006), it might be assumed that an introduction of an extra actor – pro-
regime militias – adds another layer towards the complexity of multi-actor civil wars. On the 
one hand, militias are “extra boots” on the ground increasing the number of government 
forces and assisting the incumbent with counterinsurgency (Lyall, 2010). Militias’ knowledge 
of terrain, rebel constituencies and tactics is an asset for governments (Souleimanov and 
Aliyev, 2015b), which enables the government forces to target insurgents more effectively, 
and often more lethally (Staniland, 2015). This access to intelligence both facilitates selective 
targeting and leads to increasing the incumbent’s capacity to locate and physically eliminate 
rebels. In many cases, both selective targeting of rebel leaders and lethal attacks on rebel 
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bases are combined owing to the local intelligence provided by PRMs, as was the case with 
Colombian government’s campaign against FARC rebels in Colombia (Mazzei, 2009), and 
with Janjaweed militias in Sudan (Stanton, 2015). As demonstrated by Kalyvas (2006: 174-
76), access to intelligence is a key towards enabling conflict actors to choose between 
selective and indiscriminate violence. For example, local intelligence supplied by pro-regime 
Sons of Iraq militias during the Sunni Awakening allowed the US coalition to target 
insurgents selectively (which caused few casualties), along with conducting air strikes on al-
Qaeda camps killing dozens of militants (Long, 2008).  
On the other hand, it is well documented that PRMs are often employed to do “dirty 
jobs” for governments, such as extra-judicial executions (Stanton, 2015), human rights 
violations (Mitchell et al., 2014), mass killings (Koren, 2017), and sexual violence (Cohen 
and Nordås, 2015), directed not only against civilian sympathisers of rebels, but also against 
suspected insurgents. In Kalyvas’s (2006: 108) words, militias’ “reputation for atrocity is 
well established.” Militias’ propensity for violence should be expected to contribute towards 
conflict lethality by potentially increasing opportunities for confrontations with rebel. For 
instance, it has been reported that house-to-house searches for ISIS members by the Popular 
Mobilization Front (PMF) Shiite militias in Sunni areas of Iraq have frequently resulted in 
deadly skirmishes not only with insurgents hiding amongst civilians, but also with 
disgruntled villagers resisting militias’ incursions (Shaheen, 2015; Ismaeel, 2017)   
 The PRMs’ contribution toward conflict lethality becomes more obvious when they are 
deployed in direct combat roles in counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. As militias engage 
rebels in open confrontations, they are likely to both suffer casualties and to inflict losses on 
rebels. Unlike rebel losses, militia casualties are seldom reported or included in official 
statistics (Peic, 2014: 167). However, it is uncommon for incumbents to use militias as the 
main COIN force; rather they are deployed as auxiliary units to support the army (Bohmelt 
and Clayton, 2016: 198). More typically, PRM attacks on insurgents are accompanied, or 
followed by army offensives. During Sudan’s long-lasting war against rebels in Darfur and 
South Sudan, Janjaweed attacks on rebel-controlled areas were usually accompanied or 
preceded by air strikes or artillery barrages conducted by the army (Stanton, 2015: 915). A 
similar pattern had been observed in Colombia, Peru, former Yugoslavia, Syria, and other 
civil conflicts involving PRMs. For example, extensive aerial bombardment almost always 
preceded pro-Russian Chechen militias’ advance on insurgent positions (Lyall, 2010; 
Souleimanov et al., 2018). The military strategy of relying on air strikes and heavy artillery, 
followed by land offensives by auxiliary forces enables incumbents to reduce causalities 
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amongst regular forces and to effectively weaken rebel defences prior to sending its troops. 
Although the tactic limits government casualties, it is conducive to high rebel and militia 
combat deaths. It has also been described that incumbents tend to send militias to directly 
confront rebels in densely populated areas, such as urban settlements, where the risk of 
casualties is particularly high and the chances for the governments troops to avoid lethal 
contact with the rebels are low (Mazzei, 2009; Lilja and Hultman, 2011).  
Along with the PRMs’ advantages of an offensive force, militias are also well-known 
for their defensive functions. Defined by Clayton and Thomson (2014) as civilian defence 
forces (CDFs), such militia formations are also known as village guards, citizens’ patrols or 
residents’ protection units. In contrast to such PRMs as Colombia’s AUC (Autodefensas), 
Sudanese Janjaweed, Rwandan Interahamwe or Serb Arkan’s Tigers – all of which were 
tasked with raiding and military offensives – the Turkish anti-PKK village guards, Peru’s 
Rondas Campesinas, Iraqi Sons of Iraq and the Philippines’ Manticao Village Defence Force 
were used almost exclusively to protect populated areas from rebel attacks and to collect 
intelligence amongst the local population. Clayton and Thomson (2014: 922-23) described 
defensive militias’ functions as centred on identifying insurgents, increasing local support 
and civilians’ participation. The existence of CDFs offers significant advantages to the 
incumbent by enabling governments to control rebel-threatened areas without positioning 
military outposts in each rural settlement. Although the PRMs’ capacities to hold these 
settlements in cases of large-scale rebel advances are limited (Forney, 2015), they 
nonetheless are capable of repelling smaller rebel attacks and inflicting casualties on 
insurgents before the arrival of reinforcements (Gurcan, 2015). Besides, the presence of 
CDFs within areas of rebel operation and influence allows incumbents greater access to 
intelligence and therefore increases their ability to harass and target insurgents. The use of 
militias as guards, village patrols and security units invites rebel attacks mostly because such 
objects are seen as soft targets. Unlike police- and army-protected facilities, areas defended 
by PRMs may appear easier to capture. For instance, it is reported that Kurdish PKK 
preferred targeting villages and settlements protected by the Village Guards militias instead 
of attacking areas defended by the Turkish security forces, because the rebels knew that 
rather than fighting militias would often surrender or flee (Aydin and Emrence, 2015: 68). In 
contrast to regular forces, PRMs are also poorly trained and organised. In most cases CDFs 
are also more lightly armed than regular forces (Forney, 2015), which makes them an easy 
target for rebels. Governments’ unwillingness to provide advanced weapons and equipment 
to PRMs is often due to concerns of militia members switching sides, selling their weapons to 
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rebels or criminals, or due to potential negative consequences for the regime in cases where 
militias are involved in mass civilian persecution (Downes, 2008). By targeting CDFs, rebels 
not only cause casualties on militias and suffer their own battle deaths, but they also invite 
retaliatory attacks by better armed and equipped government forces who can interpret the loss 
of militia-controlled territories as the lack of territorial control. Capturing militia-controlled 
villages and towns may prove to be an easy task for insurgents. However, it also means that 
rebels could become easy targets of government counteroffensives or air strikes. For 
example, the Taliban has found it easy to repeatedly drive off lightly-armed pro-government 
militias in Logar province (Taylor, 2013), but it has proven prohibitively costly for the 
insurgents to maintain control over the villages after expelling the government proxies as the 
Taliban combatants became exposed to full-scale government offensives. Reusing militia 
defence facilities in Logar, such as the former German military base, has proven similarly 
costly for the insurgents, because these installations were exposed to coalition air strikes. 
Therefore, deploying militias in Logar enabled the government to weaken local Taliban 
inflicting high casualty toll on the insurgents. The presentation of militias as soft targets, or as 
a decoy for the rebels, often works as part of COIN strategy in forcing rebels out of their 
hideouts and physically eliminating them, while they seek to protect the newly acquired 
territories.       
Unlike rebels, militias rarely control territory on their own, instead establishing their 
bases and training camps in government-held areas. Often, militias share their bases with 
formal security forces. This means that rebels are usually deprived of opportunity to target 
militias without engaging the army. For example, attempts by Chechen militants to confront 
pro-government kadyrovtsy militias – who were seen by rebels as easier target than heavily-
armed Russian troops – have routinely resulted in militias calling for air strikes on rebels 
(Lyall, 2010; Souleimanov and Aliyev, 2016). After engaging in skirmishes with kadyrovtsy, 
insurgents were eventually surrounded by the superior Russian forces as the militias’ strategy 
was to prevent rebel attackers from withdrawing quickly following an attack (Souleimanov, 
2007). Therefore, rebels’ efforts to target militias are likely to cause combat deaths to both 
sides regardless of the actual balance of power between the rebels and militias.  
Related to the above point is the fact that militias are often seen by governments as 
expendable forces which, as debated by the “principal-agent” paradigm (Mitchell et al., 2014; 
Ahram, 2016), can be delegated tasks that the regime is unwilling to deal with, either due to 
human rights implications or owing to possibly high death toll for regular armed forces. 
Hence, the prospect of high casualties amongst militias often emerges as of least concern for 
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the government. Either deployed as auxiliary forces or as CDFs, militias are expected to 
cripple the insurgency at all costs, including physically eliminating rebel forces by exposing 
them to government forces.    
 
Collateral lethality 
 
Previous studies emphasised that attacking civilians is a viable strategy of conflict escalation 
that has been systematically employed by both governments and insurgents (Hultman, 2007; 
Wood, 2014). However, civilian victimisation, or one-sided violence, is not always 
synonymous with battle field lethality and civil wars with high numbers of civilian casualties 
may have relatively few battle deaths. This means that the increased level of conflict-
associated violence – a significant part of which is often directed against the civilian 
population – that might be associated with militia presence in civil wars does not necessarily 
result in the growth of battle-related deaths amongst the government and rebel forces. Thus, 
distinguishing between one-sided violence against civilians in armed conflicts and battle-
related violence amongst belligerents is critical to understanding civil war lethality. This 
study is primarily concerned with conflict lethality framed by battlefield losses amongst 
combatants (Lacina, 2006; Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014). This form of conflict lethality is not 
only widely used as a measure of conflict incidence (Fearon, 2004; Hultman, 2007), but is 
also employed as a valid indicator of the lethality of violence (Lacina, 2006). The role of pro-
regime militias in civilian targeting has been examined by previous studies (Ahram, 2014; 
Cohen and Nordås, 2015). By contrast, militia presence as a factor conducive to higher 
numbers of battlefield deaths through their use of one-sided violence against civilians 
remains unexplored. 
In the context of civil wars, militias are frequently mobilised by incumbents to assist 
them in weakening rebels either through direct combat roles, or by functioning as village 
guards, intelligence-gathering networks, self-defence units, vigilante groups, or as death 
squads selectively assassinating anti-regime individuals.4 A significant part of these activities 
is directed against the civilian population rather than enemy combatants. However, even in 
                                                 
4 Although the use of militias enables incumbents to practice selective targeting, which has been 
described to result in decreased violence (Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall, 2010), the same militia groups might also be 
deployed in the same conflict to commit acts of indiscriminate violence. For example, Colombia’s AUC 
paramilitaries were known to both conduct selective assassinations and to commit mass killings. Hence, it is 
hard to associate PRM involvement with the reduction of indiscriminate retributive violence.  
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their non-combat functions, militias contribute towards higher levels of battlefield lethality. 
The PRMs efforts of eroding rebels’ civilian support structures may put insurgent groups 
under the excessive pressure to protect their civilian bases by increasing patrolling of civilian 
spaces and more defensive deployments to civilian areas, which would logically expose rebel 
forces to higher levels of confrontation with pro-regime forces.  
Scholars have argued that the success of a rebellion hinges on rebels’ ability to 
maintain and protect their civilian support base (Weinstein, 2007; Mampilly, 2012; Arjona et 
al., 2015). Support from the local population provides insurgents with supplies, shelter, 
funding and intelligence, alongside with recruits and ideological sympathisers (McColl, 
1969). Insurgencies with weak civilian support base are often described as doomed to fail 
(Kilcullen, 2005). Owing to close relationship between rebels and the local population, it is 
imperative for the rebels to ensure that their civilian sympathisers are protected and that the 
local population prefers collaboration over denunciation (Kalyvas, 2006: 177). To maintain 
such a relationship with civilians, a “carrots and sticks” strategy is commonly used by rebels 
to both entice the locals into supporting insurgents and to thwart their collaboration with the 
incumbent.  
In case if PRMs succeed in eroding popular support for rebels by brutally cracking 
down on rebel sympathisers, as was the case during Russia’s COIN in Chechnya 
(Souleimanov, 2007; Souleimanov and Aliyev, 2015a), the rebels are  forced to protect their 
support bases as the only feasible strategy of maintaining their legitimacy and preserving 
funding sources. For some rebel groups – particularly for the “sons of the soil” (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2011) organisations that derive their legitimacy from local support – the loss of 
civilian bases poses a direct existential threat. In that case, increasing protection of their 
civilian supporters and exposing their forces to confrontation may emerge as a viable survival 
strategy. All else being equal, rebels faced with increased persecution of their civilian support 
structures are left with few other options, but to retaliate by increasing the numbers and 
severity of their attacks on the incumbent. Since many PRMs operate either alongside regular 
armed forces, or in close coordination with them, often rebels are neither capable of, nor 
willing to distinguish between the formal security forces and militias. In consequence, 
increased militia activity indirectly translates into higher rebel activity, which inevitably 
translates into higher battle deaths for all dyadic actors.  
The presence of CDFs amongst civilians does not only directly threaten rebel support 
bases, but is also indicative of anti-rebel sentiments amongst the population. In other words, 
the presence of militia informants amongst the locals signals to rebels that their own 
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informants and sympathisers are in danger. In order to weed out pro-government 
sympathisers in their areas of operation and control, rebels can be compelled to increase their 
presence in civilian populated areas, which similarly to other scenarios will lead to increased 
confrontation with state security forces resulting in potential battle deaths on both sides. 
Thus, militia presence can exacerbate the battle for “hearts and minds,” encouraging rebels to 
step up their activities.  
Related to the above point is the argument, first raised by Stanton (2015: 901), that not 
all militias carry out violence against civilians and that pro-government proxies are more 
likely to engage in targeting civilians mostly when government choose to carry out attacks on 
civilians. However, even in cases when PRMs choose to avoid victimising the insurgents’ 
civilian support bases, rebels can be expected to object militia presence amongst their 
constituencies and launch attacks against them, increasing battle deaths. The mere presence 
of PRMs amongst civilians signals to rebels weakening of their control and influence over 
civilians in the area, and is therefore potentially conducive to armed confrontations and 
lethality amongst the conflict actors.    
It is noteworthy that increased government violence against rebel constituents might 
persuade rebels to change their tactics, including withdrawing and negotiating. However, 
negotiations or concessions become less favourable for rebels when they are facing militia 
violence. On the one hand, peaceful conflict settlement is rarely in the interests of militias, 
who might lose their funding from patrons and their income from illicit activities. Indeed, 
PRMs are generally described as “peace-spoilers” (Aliyev, 2019a). On the other hand, 
governments seldom invite militias to the negotiation table, instead choosing to distance 
themselves from PRMs, or to completely conceal their links with militias (Ahram, 2014). In 
consequence, government opponents receive limited guarantees of security from militia 
attacks during and after peace processes (Svensson, 2007; Johnston, 2007; Lanz, 2011; 
Souleimanov et al., 2018). For instance, the heavy presence of Interahamwe militias – the 
major perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide – amongst pro-government forces in 1994 
Rwanda, reduced the possibility of negotiated settlement between the RPF rebels and the 
government (Stedman, 1997).  
This argument has also a flip side. Once rebels found themselves under the mounting 
pressure from government forces – with militia activity further increasing the costs imposed 
on rebels – rebel groups are less capable to inflict greater casualties on the government. This 
does not mean that conflict is unlikely to cause high combatant lethality, or that as rebels 
become weaker conflict is likely to phase down. Rather, rebel weakness is likely to encourage 
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the government to step up its activities in an effort to supress the insurgency. This would 
inflict higher casualties on rebels, multiplying the total number of battle deaths.5 For 
example, the decline of Free Syrian Army and other moderate Syrian rebel groups from 2013 
to 2014 has led to increased government offensives (including active deployment of Shabiha 
militias) and growing rebel casualties.6 All of the above suggests that PRMs have numerous 
opportunities of contributing towards the lethality of armed conflicts.  
The proposed hypothesis on pro-regime proxies’ lethality does not argue that the 
presence of PRMs is the key factor pushing conflict from low to high lethality levels, rather it 
suggests that militias function as one of determinants contributing towards higher battlefield 
lethality in intrastate conflicts. The involvement of militias potentially contributes to conflict 
lethality through the “force multiplier” potential, or that an injection of more military 
resources by the incumbent that creates more opportunities for violence, and by increasing 
the costs imposed on rebels and by enabling incumbents to step up their persecution of 
dissent at a relatively low cost and with limited accountability. Thus:   
 
Hypothesis: Civil conflicts that include PRMs are more likely to become 
more lethal than civil conflicts that do not.  
 
Data and variables  
 
The data on pro-regime militias is taken from the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (NSCD) 
v.2.5-2015.7 The data set offers cross-sectional data on non-state armed groups active from 
1946 to 2014. Since the NSCD does not distinguish between PRMs and other types of armed 
groups, the UCDP conflict database was consulted in order to identify armed groups involved 
in intrastate conflicts as either pro- and anti-government organisations. All pro-government 
groups on the NSCD were coded as PRMs. This has enabled me to identify 240 militia 
groups as engaged in 88 civil wars between 1981 and 2014. Only those militia organisations, 
                                                 
5 This assumption might also apply to stronger rebels and weak governments, in which case rebels are 
likely to escalate their attacks and increase government casualties.  
6 According to Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (http://www.syriahr.com/en/), over 32,000 anti-
government rebels were killed in 2014 (18,800 in 2013). Pro-Assad forces lost over 25,000 casualties that year 
(30,240 in 2013).  
7 I choose to code my own pro-regime militia variable rather than relying on existing databases as the 
current PRM variable is best suited for the purposes of this study.  
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which participated in civil wars, were included into the current data set. The data on civil 
wars comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute Oslo 
(PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) v.4-2016, which contains information on all intrastate 
conflicts from 1946 to 2015. The UCDP’s definition of intrastate armed conflict identifies 
civil war as an incompatibility over government or territory that results in a minimum of 25 
battle-related deaths per calendar year and involves a government and one or more non-state 
parties (UCDP, 2008). The list of 88 intrastate conflicts with pro-regime militia involvement 
was composed on the basis of the ACD data set8 and the NSCD. The dataset is time-series 
cross-sectional with conflict episodes as cross-sectional component. Each recurring intrastate 
war is coded as a new conflict episode.  
Conflict lethality measured in battle deaths is a main dependent variable of this study. 
The data on battle-related deaths in each civil war was borrowed from the UCDP Battle-
Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2016, which contains the data on battlefield lethality from 1989 
to 2015. The UCDP terminology, however, does not allow controlling for conflicts either 
failing to reach a 999 deaths threshold, but exceeding well beyond the 25 deaths minimum, or 
for civil war exceeding 999 battle-deaths per year. To account for variation in conflict 
lethality, I introduce additional thresholds (25-100; 100-1,000; 1,000-10,000; 10,000 plus),9 
estimated as dummies in the robustness check (logit) models only. Lethality measures 
conflict-related violence in the UCDP’s terms of battlefield lethality, excluding civilian 
casualties and other non-battle-related deaths occurring during the conflict. This limits the 
definition of conflict lethality strictly to military confrontations amongst the belligerents.10  
The pro-regime militia presence (PRM presence) is a key explanatory variable of this 
study. The PRM presence is a binary variable that codes the PRM presence from each civil 
war’s onset until its termination. Each year of civil war constitutes a single observation. The 
PRM presence is measured from the moment militia group was established, or from the 
conflict onset in case if militias were already present prior to the start of conflict, until the 
                                                 
8 The UCDP indicates conflict participants involved in each conflict episodes, which has enabled 
identifying PRMs involved in each conflict.  
9 These thresholds are introduced in order to control not only for the UCDP’s “low-intensity” (from 25 to 
999 deaths) and “major civil war” (over 999 deaths), but also for conflicts with battle field lethality beyond 
these thresholds.  
10 Since no data is available specifically on militia fatalities and killings amongst combatants, I do not 
separate these deaths from all other battlefield casualties. Theoretically, all deaths undertaken by militias are 
part of battle-related casualties occurring during intrastate conflicts.  
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year all PRMs involved in the conflict were demobilised or the conflict terminated, 
whichever comes first. In 49 civil wars, pro-regime militia were present before the start of 
conflict. In 80% of cases, the onset of conflict encouraged the emergence of additional 
militias. In over two-thirds of civil wars more than one militia organisation was involved 
throughout the conflict period. In 82% of civil conflicts with militia presence, PRMs 
continued to function until conflict termination, or, for ongoing conflicts, until the end of 
recorded period.11  
To account for additional explanations of conflict lethality, a number of control 
variables commonly employed in research on conflict dynamics were added. To explain the 
role of ethnicity, this article introduces a categorical variable ethnic conflict, modelled on a 
similar variable from Fearon and Laitin (2004), which provides information as to whether a 
civil war is a non-ethnic conflict (0), ambiguous or mixed conflict (1) or a clearly defined 
ethnic conflict (2). As an additional measure of ethnicity’s impact on civil war characteristics, 
a variable of ethnic fragmentation was borrowed from Wimmer et al. (2009) as a log of 
percentage of country’s ethnic fragmentation. These two variables on ethnicity were 
introduced in order to control for whether the conflict type (ethnic or non-ethnic) interacts 
with the PRMs’ effect on conflict lethality, as argued in previous studies on conflict severity 
and lethality (Eck, 2009; Stanton, 2015). 
Whether a country is a democracy or not is included as a control variable because 
democracies are likely to keep battle-related deaths at a minimum. Regime type is a dummy 
that codes countries, in accordance with the Polity IV dataset,12 on a scale from 10 as full 
democracies to -10 as autocracies. To account for the effect of country size, a variable on 
population size was added as a log of population data from the World Bank database. To 
control for the role of economic development, a log of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita, measured in thousands of current US dollars was also adopted from the World 
Bank database. A variable on the percentage of mountainous terrain in each country was 
taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003) as a factor accounting for rebel capacity to hide and 
regroup and therefore possibly influence the conflict lethality. These variables were chosen as 
                                                 
11 Since only in 15 conflicts PRMs were demobilised before the end of civil war, this study does not 
control for the relationship between militia demobilisation, or disappearance, and the decline in conflict 
lethality. One noteworthy caveat, however, is that it is not the demobilisation of PRMs, but their weakening or 
decline that might be expected to have an effect on conflict lethality and its termination.  
12 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.  
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a standard set of controls commonly tested in large-N analyses on civil war (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2004; Cunningham, 2006).   
 
 
Empirical analysis  
 
This study hypothesised that civil wars with the presence of pro-regime militias are more 
likely to become more lethal for combatants. I use the UCDP battle-related deaths to run an 
OLS (ordinary linear regression) model on the log of all battle deaths. Table 1 presents the 
findings, which show that the PRM variable is highly significant and is in positive direction, 
pointing towards positive relationship between militia participation and conflict lethality.  
 
<Table 1> 
 
Descriptive statistics render further support to the findings on the relationship between 
the PRM presence and conflict lethality. Only 32% of civil wars involving militias have 
failed to develop into conflicts with high levels of lethality. The majority of civil wars with 
PRM presence have either started as major high-lethality wars, or rapidly escalated into such 
conflicts. This further observation supports an assumption that it is likely that PRMs are a 
feature of intense civil conflicts. A time-series analysis of battlefield lethality in civil wars 
with at least one militia group present (see Figure 1), shows that numerous conflicts (86%) 
produced between 500 to 20,000 battle deaths per year.    
 
<Figure 1.>  
 
In some civil wars where PRMs were deployed as soon as the conflict started – due to 
either immediate mobilisation or deployment of already functioning militias – it is hard to 
observe the precise effect of PRM presence on the increase of conflict lethality. In other 
conflicts, where militias were employed well after the conflict onset, the effect becomes more 
notable. For example, prior to the establishment of the United Self-Defence Forces of 
Colombia (AUC) in 1997, Colombian government’s COIN against FARC and ELN guerrillas 
caused 10,731 battle deaths from 1964 to 1997. The emergence of AUC spiralled the lethality 
of violence: the battle toll from 1997 until the AUC’s dissolution in 2008 reached 9,876 
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deaths, increasing the average number of battle deaths per year from 320 (in pre-1997 period) 
to over 820. Similarly the deployment of Janjaweed militias by the Sudanese government 
against rebels in South Sudan increased the average battlefield lethality toll from around 
1,380 to almost 2,000 battle deaths per year. 
With regards to control variables, most notable finding is related to ethnic conflict, 
which is in negative direction, and is highly statistically significant. These results render 
support for Lacina’s (2006), and Balcells and Kalyvas’s (2014) findings on the lack of 
correlation between conflict lethality and ethnicity. It is noteworthy that the number of ethnic 
conflicts amongst civil wars fought with militia presence is significant. Under half of civil 
wars with militia participation can be explicitly identified as ethnic conflicts. Another 22% of 
cases fall into the category of mixed ethnic conflicts, where mobilisation occurred both along 
ethnic and ideological causes, such as Mexico’s conflict with the EZLN, or Uganda’s war 
with the LRA. Perhaps the most obvious explanation of these findings is that ethnic conflicts 
with militia presence account only for 20% of all battlefield deaths and mixed (ethnic/non-
ethnic) conflicts for a bit more than 30% of lethality. Given the relatively low lethality rates 
in ethnic civil wars, the PRM involvement may not directly affect their lethality. As 
determined by Lyall (2010: 14), in ethnic conflicts, PRMs tend to rely on selective violence, 
which can cause less both military and civilian casualties and often, but not always, 
contributes towards conflict de-intensifying. Lyall (2010: 1) notes that the deployment of 
ethnic militias in Chechen conflicts enabled Russian authorities to weaken the insurgency.    
Other statistically significant result amongst the controls was produced by the regime 
type variable, which is in negative direction, suggesting that (more) democratic regimes are 
unlikely to experience major civil wars. Also, the roughness of terrain is both positive and 
significant. While previous studies arrived to diverse conclusions with regard to the 
association between the population and civil war lethality (Lacina, 2006; Eck, 2009), studies 
on conflict lethality has found that terrain had “no explanatory power” (Lacina, 2006: 286). 
Research on rebel strength similarly found the terrain roughness of little relevance (Buhaug et 
al., 2009; Fortna, 2012). Nonetheless the number of civil wars in the current dataset, which 
occurred in countries with the percentage of mountainous terrain exceeding 20% of total 
territory, is rather significant (over 30%). In other cases, despite relatively low percentage of 
mountainous territory in relation to country size, COIN was conducted almost exclusively in 
mountainous areas. These cases include Chechnya (as part of Russia), COINs in Thailand, 
India (Kashmir), Indonesia (East Timor) and Sudan. This suggests that the results pertaining 
to the roughness of terrain should be taken more seriously in research on conflict lethality. 
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The variable on ethnic fragmentation, although statistically insignificant, remains 
positive. Whereas ethnic conflict dummy controls for whether the conflict is ethnic or not, 
ethnic fragmentation variable is a log of ethnic divisions within the conflict-affected country. 
Since these two variables represent different aspects of ethnicity’s role in conflicts, it could 
be expected that they produce contradictory outcomes. Hence, the positive relationship 
between ethnic fragmentation and the incidence of high casualty conflicts may not 
necessarily occur in ethnic conflicts. For example, the Philippines’ long-lasting COIN against 
the CPP (Communist Party of Philippines) took place in a country with the high level of 
ethnic fragmentation, but was not an ethnic conflict. A similar case is Thailand’s conflict with 
the CPT, as well as the Iraqi COIN campaigns against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
Population size and economic development have coefficients below 0 and are not significant. 
A counter variable for conflict years remains positive, but insignificant, hinting that conflict 
duration is not necessarily conducive to or associated with higher conflict lethality.  
 
Expanding the analysis 
 
Additional models were designed to assess the robustness of the above findings. Another 
issue of concern is a possible endogeneity between conflict lethality and the involvement of 
PRMs. Provided that PRMs emerge during violent conflicts, how can one be sure that they 
further increase conflict lethality? However, relatively few militia organisations emerged in 
the midst of civil conflicts. In over half of conflicts (49 out of 88), militias were already 
present by the start of conflict in one form or the other, well before the increase of battle 
deaths. About two-thirds of civil wars started without a PRM present, but had militias 
assembled in the first or second year of fighting. Bearing in mind that only under 40% of 
conflicts developed into major civil wars during their first or second year – and amongst 
those the majority already had active PRMs – the argument that PRMs tend to emerge as a 
response to increasing conflict lethality finds limited support in the data.13  
                                                 
13 Nonetheless there is a probability that conflict escalation encourages already existing PRMs to expand 
their numbers, acquire better weapons and to engage more actively in military operations. For example, 
following the escalation of Syrian conflict, pro-regime Shabiha militia was “re-created” and expanded from the 
previously existent (under the same name) groups of armed smugglers and racketeers loyal to the regime (see 
Amor and Sherlock, 2014). Sudan’s Janjaweed has similarly evolved in the course of the conflict from a loose 
tribal militia association to a heavily armed militia force.   
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In the final part of the analysis, I seek to estimate whether the UCDP’s threshold 
between a low intensity conflict (25 to 999 deaths) and a major civil war (over 900 deaths) 
affects these findings. For that purpose, I introduce several logit models, which set following 
battle deaths thresholds: 25 to 100 deaths, 100 to 1000, 1000 to 10000 and 10000 plus. While 
logit models with a static DV are not a good fit for capturing temporal dimensions of conflict 
lethality, they nevertheless allow controlling for the relationship between militia presence and 
fluctuations in battlefield lethality. The results, reported in Table 2, demonstrate that PRM 
presence remains highly statistically significant across all four models. It is noteworthy that 
the PRM variable is negative in the model for low-lethality conflicts (25 to 100 deaths). 
Increase in battle-deaths appeared to be particularly notable in the PRM effect on average and 
high lethality conflicts (Models 3 and 4).  
 
<Table 2.> 
 
Coefficient plots for logit regressions (see Figure 2), lend further support to the above 
observation on the significance of average (100 to 1,000) and high (10,000 and more) 
lethality conflicts. Each increase in PRM presence in models 2 and 4 is followed by the 
increase of battlefield fatalities. In Model 3 for observations ranging between 1,000 and 
10,000 deaths per year, PRM participation becomes important only in the middle of conflicts. 
By contrast, PRM involvement, as shown in Model 1, has negative effect on conflict lethality 
in low-lethality conflicts, where it seems to decrease levels of lethality.  
 
<Figure 2.>  
 
 
Conclusion          
 
The goal of this study was to examine whether the presence of pro-regime militias in civil 
wars has an effect on the lethality of civil wars. By conducting a large-N analysis of militias’ 
impact, or the lack thereof, on battlefield lethality, this study has aimed to contribute to the 
literature on quasi-state actors in civil wars and agent-centred causes of conflict lethality. The 
claim that not only governments and rebels are involved in fighting civil wars, and are 
accountable for conflict lethality, but also such extra-state actors as militias, remained 
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neglected in the existing literature on civil war dynamics. This study proposed and tested a 
hypothesis on the militias’ role in escalating combat deaths in civil wars. The results of 
statistical tests demonstrate a strong positive relationship between militia presence and 
conflict lethality. These results were tested using additional variable operationalisation to 
control for levels of battlefield lethality. The findings demonstrated that militia presence is 
conducive to high-casualty conflicts, causing from 500 to over 1,000 battlefield deaths per 
year. While a causal relationship between militia presence and conflict lethality might require 
further and more detailed research, this study has shown that the presence of PRMs indicates 
that conflicts will likely become more lethal. Significance of ethnic conflict suggests that a 
more nuanced analysis is required in order to determine the exact impact of militias on the 
incumbent’s and rebels’ capacity and willingness to escalate violence in ethnic civil wars.  
These findings offer a number of implications for future research and practice. Firstly, 
this study emphasised that armed extra-state actors, beyond the dimension of rebel groups, 
have a potential to affect the course and dynamics of violence in civil wars. Often neglected 
in the literature on dyadic aspects of civil war onset and incidence, all extra-state actors are 
commonly generalised as anti-government elements challenging the state either in 
collaboration with rebel groups or alongside them. Secondly, the deployment of proxy forces 
by the incumbent may not only increase civilian victimisation, but also swell the numbers of 
battle deaths, because pro-regime militias – along with functioning as “extra boots” on the 
ground – both provoke rebel retaliation and, due to the PRMs access to local information, 
enable incumbents to mount more effective attacks on insurgents. Although the capacity of 
militias to undermine rebel support bases through brutal persecution of civilians is well 
known, the link between this function of PRMs and conflict lethality has thus far been 
missing. Even less mobile, poorly armed and trained PRMs, such as CDFs, still retain the 
function of provoking revenge attacks and supplying the incumbent with invaluable 
intelligence. Lastly, this study further increases our knowledge about the role of pro-regime 
militias in armed conflicts. Departing from the presentation of PRMs as agents of genocide 
and civilian targeting, or as “political rather than military institution” (Kalyvas, 2006: 107), 
this article is one of the few large-N contributions to examine militias as a military force that 
affects civil war dynamics through its physical presence in conflict zones.      
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Table 1. OLS (ordinary least squares) regression of battle-deaths 
 
 Civil war lethality  
 
 
PRMs  
 
191.9*** 
(418.66) 
 
Ethnic conflict  
 
 
-117.1*** 
(255.424) 
Ethnic fragmentation  183.9 
(908.966) 
Regime type -165.3*** 
(36.430) 
Real GDP per capita  -119.0 
(165.513) 
Population size -0.128 
(0.339) 
Mountainous terrain  26.34** 
(9.040) 
Conflict duration  164.1 
(103.135) 
Spline 114 387.6* 
(154.656) 
Spline 2 128.4* 
(568.438) 
Spline 3 -146.0 
(969.041) 
Spline 4 
 
906.9 
(104.82) 
 
Cons.  
 
311.6* 
(142.609) 
 
Number of observations  958 
R-Squared  0.998 
  
Coefficients are reported. Standard errors (clustered by conflict year) are in 
parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 
                                                 
14 A counter for conflict years was added in order to control for temporal aspects of 
conflict lethality and four cubic splines were estimated for serial correlation (Beck, Katz and 
Tucker, 1998). Each spline is designed to control for a 5-year period. 
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Figure 1. Time-series analysis of battlefield lethality in civil wars 
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Table 2. Logit regression of battle-deaths thresholds 
 
 25 to 100 100 to 
1,000 
1,000 to 
10,000 
 
10,000 + 
 
PRMs 
 
-1.516*** 
(0.206) 
 
0.334* 
(0.154) 
 
0.894*** 
(0.211) 
 
0.785* 
(0.328) 
 
Ethnic conflict  
 
-0.768 
(0.102) 
0.372*** 
(0.980) 
0.620 
(0.092) 
-0.835*** 
(0.235) 
Ethnic fragmentation -1.125** 
(0.404) 
-0.420 
(0.328) 
0.872* 
(0.326) 
0.787 
(0.732) 
Regime type -0.212 
(0.014) 
-0.826*** 
(0.138) 
0.844 
(0.134) 
-0.822* 
(0.321) 
Real GDP per capita -0.634 
(0.062) 
0.148* 
(0.684) 
-0.251 
(0.575) 
-0.169 
(0.101) 
Population size 5.420 
(3.100) 
-0.162 
(0.326) 
-1.960 
(1.970) 
-0.159 
(0.102) 
Mountainous terrain -0.149*** 
(0.043) 
-0.973 
(0.335) 
0.417 
(0.031) 
0.605 
(0.637) 
Conflict duration 0.270** 
(0.084) 
-0.689 
(0.868) 
-0.265** 
(0.090) 
-0.725** 
(0.262) 
Cons. 
 
0.629 
(0.514) 
 
-2.590*** 
(0.568) 
-1.639** 
(0.515) 
-1.271 
(0.877) 
Number of observations  958 958 958 958 
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.575 0.377 0.127 
Log likelihood  
 
-440.881 -524.108 
 
-535.118 -153.047 
Coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors (clustered by conflict) are in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Figure 3. Predictive margins (95% CI’s) of logit coefficients  
 
  
  
 
 
 
